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The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment
Process: A Theoretical Framework
The last two decades have witnessed a careful reexamination of the
rights due to persons subject to the civil commitment process.' Not
unexpectedly, most states now provide for counsel to represent the
respondent to a commitment petition at the hearing,2 thereby heeding
1. "Civil commitment" refers here to any state-imposed involuntary detention or
restriction on personal liberty based on a person's being deemed mentally ill. In 1972,
169,032 persons, or 41.8 percent of the 403,924 persons admitted to state and county mental
hospitals, were involuntarily committed. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1193 n.3 (1974).
The commitment of youths pursuant to juvenile court adjudications traditionally falls
under the rubric of civil commitment. While juvenile court proceedings and commitment
proceedings for the mentally ill share much in common, see note 20 infra, this Note
focuses only on the proper role for counsel in the civil commitment of the mentally ill.
Therefore, unless otherwise qualified, "civil commitment" here refers only to the com-
mitment of the mentally ill.
Procedures by which one is civilly committed vary greatly from state to state, rendering
description of a "typical" civil commitment procedure impossible. Most jurisdictions,
however, provide for both emergency and non-emergency detentions. Emergency deten-
tions are undertaken with minimal procedural safeguards, being premised on the belief
that the individual sought to be detained is imminently dangerous to himself or others.
The duration of such detentions varies among jurisdictions. Compare D.C. CoDE ANN.§ 21-523 (1973) (48 hours) with CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-183 (1973) (15 days).
Non-emergency commitment proceedings are generally initiated either where the in-
dividual is already hospitalized and is seeking release (through, for example, habeas corpus
proceedings, revocation of a voluntary commitment, or expiration of the emergency
detention period) or when the individual is felt to be in need of hospitalization, though
not immediately.
Who may initiate commitment proceedings also varies among states. In Washington,
for example, emergency detention may be initiated only by either a mental health pro-
fessional or a police officer. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.150 (Supp. 1974). Connecticut,
in contrast, permits emergency detention only upon a physician's certification that such
detention is necessary. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-183 (1973). Fewer restrictions generally
are placed on who is eligible to petition for non-emergency commitment proceedings.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 17-177, 17-178 (1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.160
(Supp. 1974).
Hearings show great disparity, both in the form of the tribunal and the degree of
formality, among jurisdictions. Some states vest the decision-making power in administra-
tive tribunals. See, e.g., IOwA CODE §§ 229.1-.44 (1971); others vest the power in courts.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-177 (1973). Some jurisdictions provide for jury trials.
Compare D.C. ConE ANN. § 21-545(a) (1973) with CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 17-176 to
17-206k. Burdens of proof vary as well. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard); Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th
Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed sub nora. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355 (1972)
(preponderance standard in defective delinquency proceeding); Dixon v. Attorney General,
325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard).
Frequently the complainant is unrepresented by counsel. See note 60 infra.
For a discussion of the civil commitment process, see, e.g., S. BRAKEL & R. ROcK, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1971); N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971);
Developments in the Law, supra.
2. At present approximately 42 states and the District of Columbia provide for such
representation. S. BRAKEL & R. RoCK, supra note 1, at 125-28, Table 3.12 ("Legal Counsel
in Hospitalization Proceedings"). In only 23 of these jurisdictions, however, is the com-
miting court required to appoint counsel for an unrepresented respondent. Six others
call for mandatory appointment only upon request of the respondent, while another half
dozen leave such appointment upon request to the discretion of the court. Compensation
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the lesson of history that the right to counsel is the key to the continued
vitality of other due process rights.3
Supreme Court rulings in two cases concerning due process require-
ments in juvenile court proceedings, In re Gau lt 4 and In re Winship,5
have formed the cornerstone for the proposition that counsel is con-
stitutionally required in civil commitment." In Gault the Court ruled
that a child is entitled to be represented by counsel at the adjudica-
tory stage of a juvenile court proceeding in which the child may be
found delinquent and subjected to the loss of his liberty. Winship ex-
tended the holding of Gault and required that the standard of proof
be "beyond a reasonable doubt" in proceedings in which a juvenile
is charged with an act which if committed by an adult would consti-
tute a crime. Several courts have used the logic of Gault and Winship
in fashioning a similar right to counsel in civil commitment pro-
ceedings.7
for counsel by the state is part of only 26 of these statutory schemes. Id.
Studies conducted in recent years show that the presence of counsel can dramatically
affect the outcome of civil commitment hearings. Wenger and Fletcher found a marked
increase in the duration of the hearings and a concomitant decrease in the rate of
commitment. Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State
Mental Hospital: A Confrontation of Professions, 10 J. OF HEALTH & SoCIAL BFHAVIOR
66 (1969). See Lewin, Disposition of the Irresponsible: Protection Following Commitment,
66 MICH. L. REV. 721 (1968), (empirical study of the effect of counsel on the discharge of
persons who had been committed following acquittals by reason of insanity).
After monitoring hearings in which representation was provided by attorneys on the
staff of New York's Mental Health Information Service, Gupta concluded that the role
counsel chose to assume at the hearings had an important bearing on case dispositions.
Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service: An Experiment in Due Process,
25 RUTGERs L. REv. 405, 437-38 (1971).
3. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
4. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
6. For a discussion of the similarities between the two systems, see note 20 infra.
7. In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393(10th Cir. 1968); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded for more specific order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376
(1974), appeal docketed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3332 (Dec. 3, 1974) (No. 691); Dixon v. Pennsylvania,
325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); McCorkle v. Smith, 100 N.J. Super. 595, 242 A.2d 861
(1968); People ex rel. Woodall v. Bigelow, 20 N.Y.2d 852, 231 N.E.2d 777 (1967); State v.
Collman, 497 P.2d 1233 (Ore. 1972); Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568
(1974); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (IV. Va. 1974). Some jurisdictions
granted the right to counsel prior to Gault. See, e.g., Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d
825 (D.C. Cir. 1957); State ex rel. Anderson v. United States Veterans Hosp., 268 Minn.
213, 128 N.W.2d 710 (1964) (dictum).
Since Gault and Winship both dealt with proceedings involving the commission of an
act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime, both cases could arguably be
limited in their application to mental health proceedings in which a criminal act al-
legedly had occurred. Examination of the Court's rationale, however, shows that such a
reading of the cases would be unduly narrow. Underlying the Court's decision weie the
twin effects of a juvenile commitment: the stigma that attaches to a youth's being labeled
a juvenile delinquent and the resulting loss of liberty. These considerations are as
relevant to a mental health commitment proceeding based upon a desire to protect the
respondent from a proceeding designed to protect the public from his criminal activity.
In each the respondent is threatened with the stigma of being branded mentally ill and
with the burden of involuntary commitment.
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While most state legislatures and a number of courts have thus recog-
nized the need for representation by counsel at commitment hearings,
they have completely failed to recognize the need to define the role
counsel is to play in these proceedings.8 Role ambiguity stems from
two basic assumptions underlying the system. First, even though the
respondent might say that he does not want help, his words may not
express his "true" desires because he may be mentally ill (the very
condition that renders him subject to the proceeding). Second, the
proceeding is designed to help the respondent.9
Reasoning from this perspective, which views all the other actors
in the commitment drama as benevolent figures, many feel that the
lawyer should join in seeing that his client obtains the help that the
client would want if only he knew what is in his own best interest.
If the lawyer instead fights commitment he will at times precipitate
the release of an individual who needs hospitalization and who might
consequently harm himself or the community. In addition, the prospect
of arguing strenuously for and gaining the release of a client who
counsel believes should be treated for the client's own welfare runs
counter to the humanistic values of many a lawyer. The defeat of a
commitment petition directed against a client with suicidal tendencies
or too old to care for himself cannot but weigh heavily on counsel's
mind. Thus, many commitment lawyers take the position that counsel
should oppose a commitment petition for a client only if he has de-
termined in his own mind that the client should not be committed.,
In contrast, other commitment lawyers feel that they should assume
the traditional adversary role. These lawyers resist allowing their per-
ceptions of the client's best interests to interfere with their advocacy
of the client's expressed desires, believing that their role is to advo-
8. Cases which grant the right to counsel to respondents to civil commitment peti-
tions, see note 6 supra, fail to speak directly to the question of the role counsel is to
play. On the statutes see notes 13 and 14 infra.
9. While it is analytically helpful to distinguish commitment hearings conducted for
the purpose of helping an individual from those conducted for the purpose of pro-
tecting society, see p. 1549 infra, the notion that the respondent's interests are primary
pervades discussions of the civil commitment process.
10. For reports of counsel acting pursuant to the best interest model, see M. JAcoBsoN
R. JANOPAUL, HOsPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE IENTALLY ILL 165 (1968); Andal-
man & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a
Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 59 (1974); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney
and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TExas L. REV. 424, 445, 450 (1966); Dix,
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for Reexamination, 51 M[ARQ. L.
REV. 1, 32 (1967); Wexler, Scoville, et al., The Administration of Psychiatric Justice:
Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARM. L.R. 1, 32 (1967); Contemporary Studies Project:
Facts and Fallacies About Iowa Civil Commitment, 55 IowA L. REV. 895, 920-21 (1970);
Symposium-How to Represent Clients at Mental Commitment Hearings, 23 LEGAL AID
BRIEF CASE 19, 20 (1964).
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cate, and that the decision as to commitment should be left with the
factfinder. This is the traditional notion that a lawyer's function is
to advocate the position that his client favors and to allow the client
to make the ultimate decisions that must be made in litigation."
Thus the lawyer is confronted with two alternative roles as models
for his conduct; they might be termed the "best interest" role and
the adversary or advocacy role.'12 Each role has its adherents. Faced
with these conflicting alternatives, the commitment lawyer must search
for a guide to help him choose which role to adopt.
I. Possible Sources of Guidance
A. The Statutes
The attorney looking for guidelines as to which role to choose can
search the statutes requiring his presence in vain for even a clue. Al-
though some statutes assign certain specific tasks to the respondent's
representative, these tasks relate to the acquisition of knowledge rather
than the issue of role. 3 By and large, the statutes simply call for the
appointment of counsel or a guardian ad litem without elaborating
upon the role to be played.14
B. The Code of Professional Responsibility
The newly adopted Code of Professional Responsibility is likewise
lacking in substantive guidance.'5 Canon 7 dictates that "a lawyer
11. For reports of counsel taking an adversary posture in civil commitment proceed-
ings, see Gupta, supra note 2; Andalman and Chambers, supra note 10, at 60-63.
12. Uncertainty about the proper role for counsel is reflected in the growing body of
literature which deals with this question. See Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Com-
mitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816 (1974); Cohen, supra
note 10; S. BRAKEL &- R. ROCK, supra note 1, at 55, 62; R. JANOPAUL, PROBLEMS IN
HOSPITALIZING THE NIENTALLY ILL (ABA Foundation Research Memorandum Series No.
31, 1962); R. RocK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, supra note 10, at 157-60; Andalman &
Chambers, supra note 10, at 46-54; Blinick, Mental Disability, Legal Ethics, and Profes-
sional Responsibility, 33 ALB. L. REV. 92 (1968); Golten, Role of Defense Counsel in the
Criminal Commitment Process, 10 Ams. Cim. L. REV. 385, 414-17 (1972); Developments in
the Law, supra note 1, at 1288-91; Symposium-Is Counsel Needed at Commitment Hear-
ings?, 23 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE 13 (1964); Comment, The Expanding Role of the Lawyer
and the Court in Securing Psychiatric Treatment for Patients Confined Pursuant to Civil
Commitment Procedures, 6 Hous. L. REV. 519, 531-32 (1969). In addition, many articles
written about the civil commitment process of particular states often briefly discuss the
problem. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 10, at 33; Wexler, Scoville, et al., supra note 10, at
56-59; Note, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Under Florida's Baker Act:
Procedural Due Process and the Role of the Attorney, 26 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 508 (1974).
13. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-8(2,3) (1963).
14. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-543 (1973) (counsel); N. CAR. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.6 (1973)
(counsel); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-8(1) (1963) (guardian ad litem).
15. American Bar Association, CODE oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (1970).
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should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."'
Ethical Considerations (EC) 7-11 and 7-12, although touching upon
the responsibilities of the attorney dealing with a client who is some-
how deficient, fail to make explicit the nature of those responsibilities.
All EC 7-11 states is that the lawyer's responsibilities "may vary ac-
cording to the intelligence, experience, mental condition or age of a
client .... or the nature of a particular proceeding. Examples include
the representation of . an incompetent."' 7 EC 7-12 adds only that
the lawyer may at times "be compelled in court proceedings to make
decisions on behalf of the client . . ." and that in such instances the
lawyer should "consider all circumstances" and act to "safeguard and
advance the interests of his client."'
By failing to differentiate among various circumstances under which
a lawyer is confronted with the problem of handling a less-than-com-
petent client 9 and through the use of such vague language as "safe-
guard and advance the interests of his client," the Code offers little
guidance for the representative in a commitment proceeding. Since
the very matter in controversy at the hearing is the mental condition
of the client, is it the role of the lawyer in effect to prejudge the
question and shape his role accordingly? Do decisions to be made on
behalf of the client "in court proceedings" include the fundamental
decision not to articulate the client's spoken desires to be free from
detention, or do they merely refer to tactical decisions? How does
the attorney go about ascertaining the "interests" of the client?
C. Counsel in Juvenile Commitment Proceedings
Another potential source of guidance for the attorney lies in the
role assumed by counsel in juvenile commitment proceedings, for the
16. Id. at 31C.
17. Id. at 33C.
18. Id. at 33C. EG 7-12 states in relevant part:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of making
a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his
lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian or other legal representa-
tive, a lawyer must look to such representative for those decisions which are normally
the prerogative of the client to make. If a client under disability has no legal rep-
resentative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on
behalf of the client. If the client is capable of understanding the matter in question
or of contributing to the advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is
legally disqualified from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him
all possible aid. If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative
compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider all
circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance the in-
terests of his client.
Id.
19. Consider, for example, the different responsibilities of a lawyer dealing with (a)
a client who wants to sell his house for $25, (b) a client who wants to alter his will, (c) a
client threatened by commitment.
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policies underlying the processes for the commitment of juveniles and
the mentally ill, and the manner in which the two systems have come
to affect those committed, show similarities in many respects. 20 Gault
and Winship, together with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,21 mark the
Supreme Court's. major discussions of the due process protections to
be afforded a youth in the juvenile commitment process. The Court
in Gault, speaking through Justice Fortas, noted that the juvenile sys-
tem had failed to produce the desired results, that abuses were frequent,
and that the child faced both a deprivation of liberty and the stigma
attached to being labeled a "juvenile delinquent." 22 It concluded that
the child needs "the assistance of counsel to cope with the problems
of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity
of the proceedings and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to
prepare and submit it."23
Justice Fortas also noted that, although injecting lawyers into the
process would make the proceedings adversary, this was desirable in
part: "The juvenile courts deal with cases in which facts are disputed
and in which, therefore, rules of evidence, confrontation of witnesses,
and other adversary procedures are called for."24 The Court was quick
to point out, however, that these constitutional requirements would not
eliminate all the beneficial features of the informal procedure envi-
sioned by its creators.2 5
20. Both systems were designed not to provide a means to punish those falling within
their respective jurisdictions but to help them. In neither system was an adversity of
interests between the state and the respondent assumed to exist. Rather, no matter what
the final disposition of a particular case, the outcome had to be, in theory, favorable to
the respondent, for all concerned sought only to act in his best interests. Also, in neither
system was the respondent presumed to be capable of making a mature, reasoned deter-
mination of what was in his own best interests.
21. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
22. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15, 17 (1967). Commitment under either system has proven
to have adverse effects upon the respondent in these two respects. See note 7 supra.
For examples of the use courts have made of Gault and Winship in civil commitment
cases, see, e.g., McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 257 (1972) (Douglas,
J., concurring); cases cited in note 7 supra.
23. 387 U.S. at 36. The Court also held that other procedural safeguards-the right to
adequate and timely notice, the right to confrontation of witnesses, and the privilege
against self-incrimination-were applicable.
24. Id. at 39 n.65, quoting REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND THE ADMnNISMRATION OF JusTicE, "THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY"
86-87 (1967).
25. Thus, the separate processing of juveniles and adults, the secrecy of the records
and the prohibition against disqualification from civil service employment could con-
tinue. The operation of other aspects envisioned by the system's originators, such as the
maintenance of a nonadversary atmosphere, has clearly been destroyed by the introduc-
tion of lawyers into the proceedings. Had the system operated in practice as it was meant
to in theory, however, it is far from certain that the Court would have decided as it did.
Confronted as it was by the widespread stigmatization of youths and their incarceration
in prisons masquerading as "homes," the Court wisely chose to respond to the realities of
the situation and not to an idealized vision. For a discussion of the assumptions and
goals of such a nonadversary system, see Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A
Third 'Model' of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
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In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,26 Justice Blackmun, writing the plu-
rality opinion, held that jury trials were not constitutionally required
in juvenile court hearings. Holding that the applicable due process
standard was fundamental fairness, the opinion noted that Gault and
Winship represented efforts to ensure fairness in factfinding. 27 Since
the imposition of a jury trial would add little, if anything, to the fact-
finding capability of the court, and since it raised the possibility that
the proceeding would be made into a full scale adversary proceeding,
thus ending the prospects of "intimate," "informal," and "protective"
proceedings, the plaintiff's contentions were rejected. Thus the Court
has chosen to view the Due Process Clause as requiring, in the words
of a concurring Justice, "not a particular procedure, but only a re-
sult: . . . 'fundamental fairness .. . [in] factfinding.' 2S While these
decisions may appear to call for an advocate's role, debate still persists
as to the proper role for counsel in juvenile proceedings. Unanimous
agreement is lacking that the lawyer is always to serve as advocate in
behalf of the expressed wishes of the client. In Miller v. Quatsoe,20 for
example, the court could state:
[U]nlike the criminal attorney, the juvenile lawyer, as the name
suggests, is representing a child. He cannot, as the adult criminal
lawyer perhaps can, rely on the immature judgment of his client.30
Similarly, scholarly debate over counsel's role in juvenile court pro-
ceedings has remained lively even after the three Supreme Court
rulings.3 1
26. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
27. Id. at 543.
28. Id. at 554 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29. 332 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Wis. 1971). Contra, People in the Interest of M.B., 513
P.2d 230 (Colo. App. 1973) (grants to youths in delinquency hearings the same constitu-
tional protections as are afforded adults in criminal cases).
30. 332 F. Supp. at 1275.
31. Articles urging a best interest role upon counsel in juvenile proceedings include
Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family Court, 12
BUFFALO L. REV. 501 (1963); Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile court
Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEo. L.J. 1401 (1973). For articles which advocate
an adversary approach, see Chapman, The Lawyer in Juvenile Court: 'A Gulliver Among
Lilliputians.' 10 AV. ONT. L. Rav. 88 (1971); McMillan & McMurtry, The Role of the
Defense Lawyer in the Juvenile Court-Advocate or Social W1orker?, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J.
561 (1970); Wizner, The Child and the State: Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System,
4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGnTs L. REV. 389 (1972). See generally Ferster, Courtless, & Snethen,
The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of Counsel, 39 FoRDHAM L. REV. 375
(1971); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function
and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7 (1965); Note, The Need for Counsel in the Juvenile Justice
System: Due Process Overdue, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 333, 374-77 (1974). For a discussion of
the reaction of juvenile court personnel to Gault, see W. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, IN
DEFENSE OF YOUTH 32-37 (1972).
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D. Cases Involving Claims of Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel and Failure to Provide Counsel
Yet a fourth potential source of guidance for the lawyer lies in lower
court rulings on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and failure
to provide counsel raised by civilly committed persons on appeal or
in habeas corpus petitions. Unhappily for the lawyer, however, the
decisions are marked by confusion and a lack of uniformity.
In Prochaska v. Brinegar,32 the Iowa supreme court rejected a claim
of ineffective counsel. Although counsel had failed to file an appeal
from the decision to commit the appellant, the court presumed that
counsel had "acted for the best interest of the client." This position
followed logically from the court's view that the appellant was being
detained "for his own protection and welfare as well as for the benefit
of society" and that, therefore, no loss of liberty was involved.33
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also re-
jected an argument charging a denial of effective assistance of counsel
in In re Basso,34 without shedding much light on the proper role of
counsel. The court commented that counsel, in reporting that his
client needed treatment, did "what any responsible and competent
lawyer would have done" and that, had he done otherwise, he would
have rendered his client "a distinct disservice." 3  While thus appar-
ently endorsing the best interest role for counsel, the court went on
to equate the guardian ad litem in this case with a lawyer in criminal
cases who believes his client guilty, a surprising and almost surely in-
appropriate analogy.30 Thus, the best that can be said for the Basso
opinion is that it demonstrates the confusion that exists in this area.
More recently, a few courts have indicated that the lawyer must
act as an advocate for his client's expressed desires. In Lessard v.
Schmidt,3 7 a three-judge court in Wisconsin undertook to decide
32. 251 Iowa 834, 102 N.W.2d 870 (1960).
33. id. at 838, 102 N.W.2d at 872.
34. 299 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
35. Id. at 935. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dictum) (speaking
of the due process guarantees that are required in a commitment hearing: "[T]he process
accorded in any adversary proceeding reflects the interests at stake."); Lake v. Cameron,
364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dictum) (Bazelon, C.J.) (proceedings "involving the
care and treatment of the mentally ill are not strictly adversary proceedings"). See gen-
erally Mazza v. Pechacek, 233 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger
rejected an effectiveness of counsel argument by a woman whose appointed guardian
ad litem refused to argue her position in a conservatorship proceeding brought against
her by one of her children); Hawkyard v. People, 115 Colo. 35, 169 P.2d 178 (1946)
(guardian ad lit em not required to notify the defendant in a lunacy proceeding of his
right to a jury trial).
36. See p. 1550 infra.
37. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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whether the appointment of a guardian ad litem fulfilled the require-
ment of appointed counsel, held to be constitutionally mandated earlier
in the opinion. The court flatly concluded that guardians and counsel
occupy distinct roles and that the appointment of only a guardian ad
litem failed to satisfy due process requirements. 38
Thus the lawyer who turns for guidance to the case law concerning
ineffective assistance of counsel in the civil commitment context is once
again confronted with conflicting opinions as to his proper role.
E. Summary
It can be seen that no consensus has emerged as to what role counsel
should assume when representing a client in the civil commitment
process. Numerous adherents of both the best interest and adversary
roles are found among the commitment bar. Legislators have not at-
tempted to prescribe a particular role. The Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility is riddled with ambiguity. Opinion is deeply split in the
courts and among the commentators. As more and more courts recog-
nize that respondents in the civil commitment process must be afforded
the right to counsel, however, the need to reach consensus on counsel's
proper role becomes imperative. In Part II an attempt will be made
to construct a theoretical framework in which the role of counsel can
be properly considered.
II. The Theoretical Framework
Judge Learned Hand once wrote that our system of criminal pro-
cedure "has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man
convicted."3 9 Such a fear has never plagued our civil commitment
process. Indeed, it may fairly be said that the civil commitment process
38. Id. at 1097-99. Several state courts have recently arrived at similar conclusions. E.g.,
Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1974) (respondent was entitled to an
advocate's representation, guardian ad litem prohibited from waiving any of his client's
fundamental rights, including the right to a jury trial, without the client's consent). See
State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974).
In People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636 (1966), Judge Bergan
dissented from the majority holding that the right to counsel should be extended to
those trying to obtain release from civil commitment. He reasoned that counsel's role
would have to be that of an advocate, and that too many mentally ill persons would
therefore possibly be done a disservice if the right to counsel was extended to them.
Although the cases in this section which opt for the best interest role are all pre.Gault
while those endorsing the adversary model are all post-Gault, this should not be taken as
an indication that the question has been resolved. One need only examine the literature
cited in note 12 supra and descriptive reports of the conduct of counsel at civil commit-
ment hearings, note 83 infra, to realize that the issue is far from settled.
39. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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has been long haunted by the ghost of the person in need set free.
The spectre of depriving a mentally- ill person of the treatment he
desperately needs and sending him out into the world where he will
do harm to himself or others has diverted our attention from (or sup-
plied us with a rationale for ignoring) the interference with the liberty
of others which such a system works. The lawyer's role must be ar-
ticulated as an integral part of a system in which the benefits of its
primary goal (providing treatment to those who need it) are balanced
against its possible encroachment upon the freedom of those not in
need of treatment.
The state's ability to commit the mentally ill is grounded in two
powers of the state: its police power and its authority to act as parens
patriae.40 A mentally ill person may be committed under the state's
police power if he is dangerous to others or in need of treatment for
the welfare of others.41 Under the parens patriae justification, the
mentally ill individual may be committed if he is dangerous to him-
self or in need of treatment for his own welfare. Commitment statutes
generally fail to distinguish between these two rationales and iden-
tical procedural rights are accorded to one who is subject to commit-
ment under the police power model as under the parens patriae model.
While it is recognized that elements of both often enter into the de-
cision to institute commitment proceedings, it is analytically helpful
to discuss them separately.
A. Commitment Under the Police Power
In a civil commitment based on the police power of the state, jus-
tifying a role for counsel different from that in the criminal process
is most difficult. At many points, the line between the power of the
state to commit the mentally ill who are dangerous to others and its
power to incarcerate criminals is blurred beyond recognition. 42 For
commitment under the police power, mental illness is a necessary but
not sufficient condition. Dangerousness to others must also be found.
This indicates that the state's major interest in invoking its police
power is to protect the public. Central to the commitment theory here
40. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1207-23.
41. For an example of a statute explicitly requiring a finding of dangerousness, see
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.6 (Supp. 1974). For a statute utilizing the "welfare" standard, see
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-176, 17-178 (1972). For a breakdown of the statutes for all 50
states and the District of Columbia, see Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1203-
04 nn.ll-14.
42. For a discussion comparing the two processes, see In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 656-58
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
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is the image of one who is mentally ill erupting without warning and
committing a violent act. That individual is brought into the system
not so much that he may be able to benefit from treatment, but that
others might not be harmed. 43 In this respect, then, the criminal and
civil commitment processes both function to remove from society those
deemed harmful to others.
Another possible similarity deserves to be explored. The criminal
justice system is designed to serve functions other than removing from
the community those persons deemed harmful to society. The reha-
bilitative ideal has an established position in our approach to criminal
justice. 44 To the extent that it expresses the notion that the criminal
can be "treated" for his criminal behavior, the gap between the two
systems narrows yet further. Certain forces are perceived as impelling
the criminal to his act, forces which can be altered in the institutional
setting so as to rehabilitate the criminal. Similarly, the civil commit-
ment system seeks to remove from society those persons who have
committed, or are expected to commit, harmful behavior, with the
belief that their behavior can be altered through treatment. 45 Thus
far no reason appears that explains why the role counsel plays in the
commitment proceeding should be different from the adversary role
which he assumes in the criminal proceeding (even if he believes his
client to be guilty).46 In both, the state acts not with the best interest
of the respondent in mind, but to promote the greater good of society.
The criminal justice system also serves deterrent and retributive
functions. These functions will only be served, however, if those in-
dividuals committing criminal acts are apprehended and convicted.
The deterrent effect of the threat of prison will be slight if one per-
43. The idea that the mentally ill are more dangerous than other segments of the
population is the subject of a growing body of empirical research, much of it conflicting.
See, Rappeport & Lassen, Dangerousness-Arrest Rate Comparisons of Discharged Patients
and the General Population, 121 Ams. J. PSYCHIATRY 776 (1965) and studies cited therein.
44. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-42 (1969).
45. Note that to the extent to which rehabilitation in the criminal correctional system
is effective, the often expressed notion is undermined that the lawyer, in trying to "get
his client off," is acting in his client's best interests.
46. That an attorney owes a client whom he believes to be guilty a full defense is
widely accepted. See, e.g., Orkin, Defence of One Known to be Guilty, 1 CRIm. L. Q. 170
(1958); M. SCHWARTZ, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 74-87 (1961); American Bar Association, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Tentative Draft
1970); New York County Criminal Courts Bar Association Code ff 3. This is not to say
that the legal profession is of one mind as to the boundaries of ethical behavior in de-
fending a client. See, e.g., Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of De-
fense Counsel's Responsibility, 64 Micn. L. REV. 1493 (1966); Freedman, Professional
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 1469 (1966); Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality,
64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966). The consensus within the profession, however, is clearly
that a guilty person deserves as full a defense as his lawyer can provide him.
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ceives but a small possibility of incarceration; and the retributive
function comes into play only upon conviction. Erroneous acquittals,
then, will render the criminal justice system less effective. As deter-
rence and retribution are of far less significance in the civil commit-
ment scheme, both in theory and practice, the deleterious effect of
erroneous releases will be less marked there than in the criminal
justice system. Thus, under the police power model, society should
be no more concerned if a mentally ill person escapes commitment
due to adversarial lawyering.47
If society, however, were to view the improper incarceration of
one in the criminal system as more egregious an error than a mistaken
mental hospitalization, it would be less concerned if a person were
mistakenly committed than mistakenly convicted. This view would
spring from the perception that prison exists to punish, while civil
commitment is a process existing only for the good of the patient.
Neglected in such an argument, however, is that the fundamental
penalty paid by convicted criminals has its source not in the actual
routine inside the prison, but in their loss of personal liberty,48 a
loss endured by those committed to mental hospitals no less than by
those imprisoned.40 Thus, even if one were to receive excellent care
in a hospital, the erroneously committed person suffers no less a loss
of liberty than the unjustly convicted individual. Since improper in-
carceration is just as grievous a mistake in one system as in the other,50
the adversarial role is just as appropriate for counsel in the civil
as in the criminal commitment system.
Psychiatrists often argue, however, that hearings, especially adver-
sary hearings, should not be held. They contend that such hearings are
anti-therapeutic for the respondent2 1 Such a generalization must, how-
47. To the extent that society felt itself in need of protection from the uncommitted
mentally ill more acutely than it does from acquitted criminals, this argument would be
vitiated. One would encounter great difficulty, however, in attempting to argue persua-
sively that the importance the public places upon being safe from mentally ill persons is
so overriding so as to outweigh not only its fear of unconvicted criminals, but also the
deterrent and retributive functions of the criminal system as well.
48. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 33 (1971). See
generally Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (at stake in criminal trial is de-
fendant's liberty, an interest of transcending value).
49. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
50. The reality of the conditions in most mental hospitals, which often provide little
more than a facility in which to warehouse the mentally ill, only serves to reinforce this
conclusion. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310-12 (5th Cir. 1974); New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D.N.Y.
1973). So too does the fact that most statutes provide, either explicitly or implicitly, that
involuntary civil commitments, unlike most criminal commitments, are to be of in-
definite duration.
51. See, e.g., M. GUrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 298 (1952);
Guttmacher, Problems Faced By the Impartial Expert Witness in Court: The American
View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 369, 377 (1961).
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ever, be taken with such a large grain of salt that it simply cannot be
swallowed whole. Given the wide range of mental illnesses with which
one can be afflicted, and the complexities and dynanics of each indi-
vidual's case, it is only remotely possible that hearings are anti-thera-
peutic for all patients. That they do harm to even a substantial mi-
nority has never been established. Indeed, for many patients who
believe they are being unjustly kept, an adversary proceeding could
well have a legitimating effect and thus prove to be quite therapeu-
tic.52 As no solid evidence has yet been produced in support of the
psychiatrists' contentions, adversary hearings should not be foregone.5
In sum, the lawyer representing an individual in a commitment hear-
ing based on the state's police power should assume an adversary
stance. Nothing argues persuasively for counsel's assuming a role any
different from the advocate's role taken in the criminal process.5 4
B. Commitment Under the Parens Patriae Model
Determining the proper role for counsel under the parens patriae
rationale for civil commitment presents greater analytical difficulties.
Most analysis which recommends that the civil commitment attorney
take an adversary position simply contends that, as the client is being
threatened with a deprivation of liberty, he faces the same disposi-
tion that he would in a criminal case. 55 Thus, even if the proceeding
is denominated "civil," the client is still owed an adversary hearing.
This line of argument fails to confront the essential difference between
the civil commitment proceeding and a criminal case; that is, if the
client is acquitted in a criminal case, he benefits, while if he gains
release in the commitment proceeding, in some instances he will be
deprived of needed though unwanted treatmentP 6
52. See Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1285. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 38 n.65 (1967) (suggests that counsel's presence in juvenile proceedings may be
therapeutic).
53. This is not to say that adversary hearings will never affect adversely a mentally ill
individual. Hopes may be raised only to be dashed, and persecution complexes may be
fed, to recite but a portion of the psychiatrists' anti-hearing litany. Such harm, however,
likely to be restricted to a limited number of instances, is far outweighed by the harm
that would be incurred by proscribing such hearings.-
54. Other benefits which were envisioned by its originators to flow from the in-
formal, nonadversary procedure need not necessarily be sacrificed. Court records may
still be kept confidential and civil disabilities need not attach to an adjudication of
commitment. See note 65 infra. Nor must the respondent be required to attend his hear-
ing if he knowingly waives his right to attend. The question of what would constitute a
knowing waiver is, of course, the proper subject for tomes of scholarly writings and will
not be dealt with here. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
55. See cases cited in notes 37, 38 supra; articles cited in note 12 supra.
56. So as to pose the problem in its most difficult form, it is here assumed both that
no rehabilitative benefits flow from criminal commitments and that those who are
civilly committed receive beneficial treatment.
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It must be emphasized that no adjudicative system that we can de-
sign will be without its defects. Errors are bound to be made and
their costs will inevitably fall upon some members of society indi-
vidually and upon society as a whole. In the criminal justice system,
for example, we can be certain that some of the proverbial 10 guilty
men who are acquitted and set free so that one innocent man will
not unjustly be convicted57 are going to return to the community and
commit other crimes. The harm inflicted by such acts upon the vic-
tims represents a cost that must be weighed against the harm of an
unjust conviction. Society has determined that the latter cost out-
weighs the former. Thus, society is willing to acquit the "10 guilty
men" and absorb the harm they inflict rather than convict one man
unjustly.
In the civil commitment system, too, the" costs of various mistakes
must be identified and weighed against each other. In the parens
patriae model, where the focus is not on harm to others, but on the
needs of the individual respondent, society as a whole bears no direct
cost.rs Rather, the cost of mistakes falls upon those who need treatment
but who are not committed ("undercommitments") and those who
do not need treatment but who are committed ("overcommitments").
The balance that society must strike, then, involves determining how
many overcommitments it will tolerate in order to insure that a person
in need of treatment does not escape commitment; or, alternatively
stated, how many undercommitments society is willing to accept so
that one who is not in need of treatment is not mistakenly committed.
Although obviously not susceptible to precise analysis, such a compari-
son is constantly being made. The role of counsel should be formulated
as one element of an adjudicatory system designed to achieve whatever
balance it is that society determines is proper.
1. Overcommitments
Several considerations tend to suggest that, at present, many over-
commitments are occurring. We have, of course, no accurate means
of determining whether an unacceptable number of people are pres-
ently being committed who should not be, since we possess no precise
yardstick by which we can objectively measure who truly needs to be
committed. The fact is, however, that when lawyers are present at
57. "MThe law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than one in-
nocent suffer." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
58. Society does, however, bear indirect costs arising from mistaken commitments by
dint of the diminished respect for liberty engendered by such mistakes.
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commitment hearings, commitment rates have been significantly re-
duced.59 This suggests that psychiatrists unchecked by opposing coun-
sel seek to commit many who, given the articulated legal standard, 60
should not be committed.
First, when a psychiatrist predicts that a person will not engage in
behavior harmful to himself and is mistaken, he will likely learn of
his mistake. When a psychiatrist predicts that a person will engage in
such harmful behavior, however, the person will likely be confined
to a hospital. If he fails to engage in the predicted harmful behavior,
his conduct will of course be attributed not to error on the psychia-
trist's part, but to the institutional restrictions. Thus the psychiatrist
will receive more negative feedback from erroneous predictions of
nonharmful behavior than of harmful behavior and will be thus in-
clined to overpredict rather than underpredict harmful behavior."'
Second, from an institutional perspective, the publicity which er-
roneous predictions of nonharmful behavior receive leads the institu-
tional psychiatrist to recommend commitment in marginal cases. Quite
often a person awaiting a commitment hearing is already being de-
tained at an institution. 62 Nothing can be more distressing to the
superintendent of a hospital than to read newspaper accounts of a
suicide or violent crime committed by a patient recently released.
Thus, fear of public reaction and consequent political repercussions
will also lead the institutional psychiatrist toward overprediction.
Finally, once a person is alleged to have mental problems, the psy-
chiatrist tends to interpret his behavior in the framework of a mental
illness.6 3
The chances are, then, that large numbers of individuals are being
committed who should not be. The cost to these individuals is clear.
They are being deprived of the most fundamental of their freedoms,
their liberty. The rationale that treatment is being given them does
not detract from the harm. These are persons who, the legislatures
59. See note 2 supra.
60. See note 64 infra.
61. Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, 4
TRIAL, 33 Feb./Mar. 1968 at 29.
62. Involuntary commitment proceedings are frequently instituted following the ex-
piration of the statutory period of detention permitted pursuant to an emergency ad-
mission. Detention prior to the hearing also occurs when the individual, a voluntary
patient, seeks release from the hospital and the institution decides to press for commit-
ment. Hearings are also conducted in accordance with statutory schemes directing periodic
judicial review of each committed patient's case. Finally, hearings are held pursuant to a
petition of habeas corpus filed by the patient.
63. See, e.g., Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973);
Kumasaka 9- Gupta, Lawyers and Psychiatrists in Court: Issues on Civil Commitment,
32 MD. L. Rav. 6, 34 (1972).
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have determined, 4 should not be committed involuntarily or com-
pelled to undergo treatment. Even if they receive excellent care, they
are still being deprived of their liberty unjustly.a
The adversary system, premised on the belief that the truth of a
controversy is most likely to surface when the two sides confront each
other in a courtroom, has traditionally been held to be the method
of adjudication most likely to reduce the number of mistaken incar-
cerations in the criminal system. 6 This should hold true for the cases
in the civil commitment area as well.67 If so, the civil commitment
64. In states utilizing a dangerousness criterion, it is clear that legislatures meant to
preclude the involuntary commitment of those individuals who are mentally ill and who
could benefit from treatment, but who present no danger to themselves. Further, it can
be argued that implicit within a seemingly lesser standard such as "in need of treatment
for one's own welfare" is a dangerousness criterion. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Thus even in those latter states not all individuals who would
benefit from treatment are properly subject to involuntary commitment.
65. Other legal deprivations may befall the committed individual. Although some
states make explicit that an adjudication of commitment does not render an individual
legally incompetent, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-206(c) (1973), in other jurisdic-
tions commitment may so affect a patient, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-11
(1963); id. § 71-1-26 (Supp. 1971). Commitment may also bar an individual from a wide
variety of professions, see, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 256.286(1) (1971) (license to practice
law); GA. CODE ANN. § 80-106 (1973) (riverboat pilot's license); and from making a con-
tract, see, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-21 (1963).
Another consequence of commitment is the stigma which attaches to being deemed
mentally ill, often resulting in severe repercussions in a person's later life, in terms of
personal relations, employment and educational discrimination, and evaluation of self-
esteem.
66. Some empirical work has been done recently in an effort to test the hypothesis
that an adversary procedure provides for more accurate factfinding. Lind, Thibaut &
Walker, Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceed-
ings, 71 Micn. L. REV. 1129 (1973). There, the authors found no significant difference in
diligence in seeking information between those "attorneys" assigned to inquisitorial and
adversary roles, except when the distribution of facts was unfavorable to the- client. Under
those circumstances (likely to be the circumstances surrounding commitment hearings in
most instances), the "attorneys" to whom the advocate's role had been assigned demon-
strated greater diligence in ferreting out facts. Since the best interest model resembles an
inquisitorial method of factfinding, these results are applicable to the civil commitment
situation.
The same three authors also sought to investigate empirically the comparative effect'
of the presentation of evidence in adversarial and inquisitorial systems. They found that
adversary presentation had its greatest impact in situations in which the judge or jury
were predisposed toward a given outcome, which is likely to be the case at the civil com-
mitment hearing. Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal
Decisionmaking, 86 HARv. L. REV. 386 (1972). See generally Barrett, The Adversary System
and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37 NornRE DAME LAW. 479 (1962); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE
3-8 (1965); cf. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-107 (1950).
67. The wide use of psychiatrists as experts in various legal forums has sparked
debate in regard to the efficacy of the adversarial process in presenting accurately such
expert testimony. Psychiatrists contend that psychiatric material is the most difficult of
all medical knowledge to present accurately from the witness stand and that cross-
examination unfairly distorts the testimony given. Guttinacher, supra note 51, at 370.
See generally Van Dusen, The Impartial Medical Expert System: The Judicial Point of
View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 386 (1961); Willis, Psychiatric Testimony, Trial Gamesmanship And
the Defense of Insanity, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 32 (1968). The general feeling among this
group is that courts should appoint impartial experts who will report to the court and
not be subject to adversarial inquiry.
On the other hand, some argue that use of an impartial expert will necessarily result
in presentation of a biased view, especially in a field such as psychiatry, where strong
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lawyer can best assure that persons will not be mistakenly committed
by assuming an adversarial rather than a best interest role.
2. Undercommitments
Proponents of the best interest role, however, fear that placing the
lawyer in the role of advocate will concomitantly result in a large
increase in releases for individuals who should be treated. The easiest
way to calm this fear would be to reiterate that our legal system is
based on the notion that the adversary system is best able to ferret
out the truth, and thus the lawyer's adversarial role should not in-
crease the rate of undercommitments. Behind this fear, however, must
lie the idea that the adversary system is not the most accurate means
of arriving at the truth.68 Were this so, and were the benefits gained
through the decrease in overcommitments not worth the cost of the
increase in undercommitments, the adversary role might be inappro-
priate for the civil commitment lawyer.
At first glance, the prospect of a jump in the number of undercom-
mitments appears frighteningly real, since currently in many jurisdic-
tions the complainant is often not represented by counsel. 9 The dan-
disagreement persists over many basic questions. See, e.g., Polsky, Expert Testimony:
Problems in Jurisprudence, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 357 (1961). See generally the literature on the
adversary process cited in note 66 supra.
The danger of bias is great enough to render the latter the more persuasive view. In
addition, the court-appointed impartial witness approach uses a hatchet where a scalpel
would do. The solution to the problem of distortion of psychiatric testimony on cross-
examination lies in proper regulation of cross-examination, not in precluding contrary
views from consideration. Thus, for example, one might want to bar counsel from in-
quiring of a psychiatrist about particular details of a psychiatric test employed and
restrict him to probing the expert witness about the reliability of the test. For an example
of the type of questioning which sours psychiatrists on the adversary procedure, see United
States v. McNeil, 434 F.2d 502, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
68. This is not, however, necessarily incompatible with our preference for the ad-
versary system in criminal cases. If the adversary system is more accurate than the
inquisitorial system in avoiding mistaken incarceration, but less accurate in avoiding
mistaken acquittals or releases, given our societal preference for mistaken acquittals over
incarcerations, we might still deem the adversary system the better one. For example,
suppose that out of every 10 cases, an inquisitorial system produced the correct verdict
in nine, and that the one incorrect verdict results in an innocent man's conviction.
Further suppose that out of every ten cases, the adversary system produces only seven
correct results, but that the three mistakes are all acquittals of guilty individuals. The
inquisitorial system would produce more accurate results (90 percent to 70 percent) than
the adversary system, but would be considered the inferior mode of adjudication. Given
that society may wish to strike a different balance between mistaken incarcerations and
releases in the civil commitment system than it does in the criminal justice system, how-
ever, it cannot simply be assumed that the adversary system is the preferred mode of
adjudication.
69. Cohen reports that no attorney for the complainant is present at commitment
hearings in Texas. Cohen, supra note 10, at 448. In only a few of the 55 hearings
monitored at Bellevue by Kumasaka and Gupta was counsel for complainant in atten-
dance. Kumasaka & Gupta, supra note 63, at 8. In one Arizona county the judge was
unaware that the state (the usual complainant) was permitted representation, so accus-
tomed was he to its absence. Wexler & Scoville, supra note 10, at 51. See Johnson, Due
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ger exists, therefore, that the system lacks an adequate counterweight
to the lawyer's proposed adversary role and that the balance will be
tipped too far in the respondent's direction.70 Legislatures, of course,
can always provide that counterweight by requiring counsel for the
complainant to be present at the hearing. That the lack of committing
counsel will always work against commitment, however, is not clear.
When the judge is forced by the absence of counsel for the com-
plainant to look himself for holes in the respondent's case and to de-
velop the case for commitment, he must identify himself with the
complaining party. He must subsequently try to revert to his position
of neutrality, and in such a role is required "to view with distrust
the fruits of this identification and be ready to reject the products
of his own best mental efforts." 71 The difficulty of this return to a
neutral stance suggests that the judge, temporarily filling the role of
complainant's counsel, may at times provide more than an adequate
counterweight to the unopposed advocate.
A more important counterweight to the lack of counsel for the
complainant, however, is the difficulty which counsel for the respon-
dent faces in attempting to win a civil commitment case. A commit-
ment hearing generally commences only when some psychiatrist recom-
mends that the respondent be confined.72 Although those psychiatrists
who testify in favor of commitment often do so without the support
of counsel, the deference which is normally accorded their opinions
by the factfinder ensures that premium value will be placed upon
their testimony.73 Thus, respondent's adversarial lawyer will be hard
Process in Involuntary Civil Commitment and Incompetency Adjudication Proceedings:
Where Does Colorado Stand? 46 DEN. L.J. 516, 545, 548 (1969); see generally Pfrender,
Probate Court Attitudes Toward Involuntary Hospitalization: A Field Study, 5 J. FAm.
L. 139 (1965).
70. This fear was articulated in In re Lang, a juvenile court case where the judge
complained that she frequently had to elicit the testimony of the state's witnesses. 44
Misc. 2d 900, 255 N.Y.S.2d 987, 992 (Fain. Ct. 1965).
71. V. COUNTRYMAN, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SocmarY iii (1962).
72. Most state statutes, for example, require a pre-hearing psychiatric examination. S.
BRAKEL & R. RoCK, supra note 1, at 50-51, 70-76. Many states require medical corrobora-
tion when the commitment petition is initially filed.
Reluctance among psychiatrists to attend commitment proceedings has been reported.
For example, Bruce Ennis claims that in 60 percent of the cases in which a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus is filed the patient is discharged, often because the hospital staff
wishes to avoid the inconvenience of a hearing. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 289 (1969, 1970). [Hereinafter cited as Hearings.] Ac-
counts of hearings, however, generally note the presence of psychiatrists. At the very least,
the certificates filed by the psychiatrists and the medical records of the patient are avail-
able to the courts.
73. In the Wenger and Fletcher study, for example, the factfinder disagreed not once
with the psychiatrists' opinions in the 81 hearings observed. Wenger & Fletcher, supra
note 2, at 68. See also Wexler, Scoville, et al., supra note 10, at 60; Pfrender, supra note
69, at 147; R. Rock, Al. Jacobson, & R. Janopaul, supra note 10, at 155; cf. Weihofen,
Detruding the Experts, 1973 WAsH. U.L.Q. 38 (regarding sanity-insanity determinations).
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pressed to defeat an unrepresented petitioner or overcome the testi-
mony of petitioner's psychiatrist.
At times, however, respondent's lawyer will prevail through cross-
examination, investigation of the facts, or his own lay and expert wit-
nesses, and in that case we must consider the likelihood that the win-
ning respondent was actually in need of treatment. This will turn par-
tially upon the extent to which psychiatrists' predictions of harmful
behavior are reliable and accurate.7 4 The greater the reliability and
accuracy of psychiatric evaluations, the more limited the likely impact
of the lawyer as adversary. His ability to produce doubt in the mind
of the factfinder will be reduced. The chances of finding another psy-
chiatrist to testify in favor of his client will be diminished. Even if
he does locate a psychiatrist who will so testify, the testimony of the
committing psychiatrist may still be given priority by the factfinder.
Further, in those cases in which the psychiatrist's prediction of dan-
gerousness to self is linked to past aberrant behavior, the respondent
is unlikely to escape commitment.
If, on the other hand, no reliable means exists of assessing the treat-
ment needs of individuals whose commitment is sought, the adversary
lawyer is more likely to be able to discredit petitioner's predictions
of harmful behavior, find credible experts to testify for the respon-
dent, and thus prevent the respondent's civil commitment. If diag-
noses of harmful behavior are in fact not reliable and accurate, the
problem of committing many who should be left free in order to
ensure the commitment of the one who is in need of treatment re-
surfaces, and the validity of the legal standards must be questioned.75
But society should, in any event, be very hesitant to confine people
without the benefit of the necessary tools of prediction.
The entire civil commitment process is premised on the assumption
that psychiatrists generally are both accurate and reliable.76 Even ac-
74. Reliability signifies the extent to which psychiatrists agree in their diagnoses of a
particular individual. Accuracy refers to the correctness of their diagnosis. Obviously,
psychiatrists can be quite reliable without being accurate.
75. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), the Court declared
unconstitutional a vagrancy ordinance which lacked definite standards and thus afforded
officials an opportunity for "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law." Id.
at 170. If psychiatric predictions of harmful behavior are unreliable and inaccurate, the
standards for commitment are arguably as imprecise as those invalidated in Papachristou.
76. Empirical study of this question has been limited. What has been done, however,
suggests that psychiatrists are far from accurate in their predictions of dangerousness. See
Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974) and studies cited therein.
If in fact psychiatric evaluations are unreliable, demanding that counsel determine
the best interests of his client becomes even more untenable. If experts in the field are
unable to agree, on what ground can counsel presume to evaluate his client's needs?
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cepting this assumption, the process is skewed towards overcommit-
ting.7 7 Since the lawyer's ability to effect releases is in large part di-
rectly related to the tendency of psychiatrists to overpredict harmful
behavior,78 and given the obstacles he must hurdle to gain release for
his client, it appears that the adversary lawyer's impact will be much
greater in reducing overcommitments than in increasing undercom-
mitments when he wins the release of his client. This is not to say
that no undercommitments will result from counsel adopting an ad-
versary stance. Human error is inevitable. The point is, however, that
fears of greatly increased undercommitments are unfounded. What-
ever is currently thought to be a proper balance between overcommit-
ments and undercommitments under the parens patriae model of civil
commitment, the adversary role should enhance the presentation of
facts and improve decisionmaking in the civil commitment process.
Even if placing the lawyer in an adversary position results in more
undercommitments than are anticipated by the preceding paragraphs,
or if the slight anticipated increase in undercommitments is itself so-
cially unacceptable, means other than removing the lawyer from his
traditional role as advocate can be employed to rectify the balance.
Evidentiary rules are used as a means of striking the proper balance
between mistaken acquittals and convictions in the criminal process.79
We require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict; we do not
require absolute certainty. We allow some hearsay evidence into court,
though we believe it to be less reliable than live testimony by the
declarant. We allow inferences to be drawn from certain sets of facts,
knowing that the inference does not inevitably follow from those facts.
77. See p. 1554 supra.
78. If the higher visibility of erroneous predictions of nonviolent behavior drive the
psychiatrist toward overpredicting violent behavior, the lawyer will more likely be able
to produce contrary expert testimony. By locating a psychiatrist relatively uninvolved in
the civil commitment process, thus relatively unexposed to such negative feedback,
the lawyer will have found an expert less prone to overpredicting dangerousness. Similarly,
the lawyer may search for expert opinions among psychiatrists insulated from the in-
stitutional pressures which impel institutional psychiatrists toward recommending com-
mitment where it is not needed. Third, through presentation of lay witnesses and in-
vestigation of relevant facts, the lawyer may convince the factfinder, and at times the
committing psychiatrist, that the latter's prediction was erroneous. In the Wenger and
Fletcher study, for example, the psychiatrists' opinion was followed in every case. In
those cases in which lawyers were present, however, the psychiatrist recommended com-
mitment much less frequently. Wenger & Fletcher, supra note 2, at 68-69. Finally, the
lawyer may present alternatives to involuntary commitment, such as available out-patient
care, of which the committing psychiatrist had been unaware, and which would have
persuaded him not to recommend commitment had he known of them.
79. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368-72 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring).
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These same mechanisms that allow for adjusting the balance in the
criminal process are available for manipulation in ihe commitment
process. If undercommitments need to be reduced, the burden of proof
can be lowered. If society is willing to accept more mistaken detentions
in the civil commitment system than in the criminal justice system, a
beyond a reasonable doubt standard may be rejected in favor of a
clear and convincing evidence or a preponderance of the evidence
standard. Alternatively, hearsay evidence can be admitted, or more in-
ferences can be allowed.80 Should the legislature conclude that the
factfinder needs more information presented in a more orderly fashion,
investigatory units can be established as adjuncts to the court. By dis-
cretely manipulating the evidentiary rules rather than denying the
lawyer his adversary role, society can more effectively implement the
balance it seeks to achieve in the civil commitment process.
Thus it has been established that the adversary lawyer's impact will
work largely in the direction of reducing overcommitment. While
undercommitments may increase, they will likely do so by only a
small number. Further, society has available to it other tools by which
to "fine tune" the balance between overcommitments and undercom-
mitments achieved through adjudication.
The question remains, however, whether counsel acting according
to the dictates of the best interest role would function as effectively
as or better than the adversary lawyer and produce results as favored
or more favored by society. Several considerations compel the conclu-
sion that he will not.
First, as a practical matter, less incentive exists for a best interest
lawyer to solicit expert opinions, probe facts, and seek out alternative
dispositions. Faced with the opinion of an apparently competent psy-
chiatrist that his client constitutes a danger to himself if not com-
mitted, counsel's natural reaction will often be to nod in agreement
and decide that, indeed, his client's best interests demand hospitaliza-
tion. The tendency to defer to expert judgment and counsel's probable
unfamiliarity with the psychiatric jargon with which the opinion will
be delivered stand as strong deterrents to the best interest lawyer's
deciding to fight commitment. An attorney placed in the role of ad-
vocate, however, cannot acquiesce as easily in the psychiatrist's opinion.
The incentive will be greater to ferret out facts and opinions in support
80. To some extent such tactics are already being employed. See Legal Aid Agency of
the District of Columbia, PRACTICE MANUAL FOR CAsES BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON MENTAL
HEALTH, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 72, at 975, 978. The Commission on Mental
Health hears commitment cases and makes reports and recommendations to the court. At
the Commission's hearings, "there are no rules of evidence and objections are useless."
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of his client's desire for release"1 and thereby fulfill his adversary role.
Second, the best interest lawyer is effectively insulated from claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel. If counsel acts in the best interest
role, courts will experience great difficulty separating out those lawyers
who have acted in a manner they considered consistent with the best
interests of the client from those who have acquiesced in commitment
simply as a means of avoiding work.
Third, should a client be committed, the adversary lawyer is more
apt to explore possible avenues leading to discharge. Thus mistaken
commitments stand the possibility of rectification. Where the best in-
terest lawyer acquiesces in his client's commitment, however, no such
possibility of redress exists.8 2
In summary, then, it appears that the lawyer acting in an adversary
capacity will work to reduce overcommitments without substantially
increasing undercommitments; that more suitable methods than chang-
ing counsel's role are available for adjusting the balance between over-
commitments and undercommitments; and that the adversary lawyer
is more likely to achieve results compatible with societal goals and
values than is the lawyer fulfilling the best interest role.
III. Civil Commitment and the Adversary Lawyer
That commitment hearings be fair is insufficient; they must ap-
pear to be fair as well, both to the public and to the person involved.
Justice would have to be downright myopic to see in the pictures
painted of commitment hearings in Texas, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Arizona, and elsewheres 3 any semblance of a fair hearing. Nor could
81. See note 66 supra.
82. Some commentators have urged an adversary role upon counsel except in instances
in which his client clearly is in serious need of treatment. See, e.g., Developments in the
Law, supra note 1, at 1288-91. Three problems inhere in such a solution. First, it gives to
lawyers prone to defer to expert psychiatric opinion license to acquiesce in that opinion
merely by independently determining that the client is an extreme case. Second, it
provides another layer of insulation between the lawyer and allegations of "ineffective
assistance of counsel." If the client is committed and subsequently raises such a claim,
the attorney can plead in defense that he had determined this was an extreme case in
which the best interest approach was proper. Third, as a practical matter, the lawyer's
impact will be slightest in those cases in which the client clearly needs treatment. If it is
obvious to the lawyer, it should be obvious to the psychiatrist and factfinder as well.
Nothing is gained therefore, by making such an exception to the general rule that
counsel should act as adversary.
83. Cohen describes the typical procedure in Texas as one in which one lawyer is
appointed by the court to represent all the respondents scheduled for a hearing on a
particular afternoon. In one observation, a 75 minute session, 40 clients had hearings
and all were committed. The attorney saw not one of them prior to the hearings, even
though two had written him. Only two of the 40 were present at their hearings, one
of whom protested the proposed commitment. Following, at best, a halfhearted cross-
examination of the testifying physicians, he assured the protesting client that she would
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a person so represented help but feel that he was being railroaded
into the hospital. Whether the lawyer's efforts as advocate alter the
results of a particular hearing or not, they should at least help generate
the appearance of fairness, thus adding to the integrity of the com-
mitment process.
Once the adversary nature of the lawyer's role is reestablished in
commitment proceedings, his role in operational terms resembles that
in ordinary cases. He may serve as elucidator of the law, laying out
for his client in objective fashion the legal problems facing him, the
consequences of a commitment decision, the likelihood of prevailing
at the hearing, and possible alternatives to commitment. The ultimate
decision as to whether to challenge the commitment petition must,
however, be the client's. If the client expresses a desire to contest the
commitment, the lawyer must do all he can to defeat the petition.
As in a criminal setting, of course, he may discuss with the patient
the possibility of "plea bargaining"; that is, negotiating less restric-
tive, more desirable alternatives to commitment. Arrangements may
be made for his client's voluntary participation in an outpatient pro-
gram in lieu of commitment, for example, or for trial visits away from
the hospital while still under the institution's jurisdiction. Should the
commitment decision be unfavorable, counsel must be prepared to take
an active role in the dispositional phase, seeking out alternatives to
total commitment in the hospital. Again, however, the client must be
presented with a range of alternatives and be allowed to choose the
one he prefers. Although communication with the respondent may
prove troublesome (and in some instances impossible) and the lawyer
might never be certain that his client means what he says, he must
act upon the expressed desires of his client. It is all the lawyer has
to go on.8 4
not be in the hospital for more than a few weeks. At this point she acquiesced in her
commitment. The attorney's sole tasks in the other 39 hearings consisted of signing a
waiver of jury trial form and insuring that the statutory notice requirements had been
observed. Cohen, supra note 10, at 428-30.
Nor is this practice restricted to Texas. Such a procedure is reported as being the
standard practice in Colorado. Johnson, supra note 69. Descriptions of hearings in Los
Angeles and San Francisco reveal minimal efforts by the participating attorneys. R.
ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, supra note 10, at 152-56; Note, The Need for Reform
in the California Civil Commitment Procedure 19 STAN. L. RaV. 992, 997 (1967).
In Arizona, the role played by defense attorneys in one county is said to be virtually
indistinguishable from the role played by the prosecuting county attorneys in the
counties in which the latter appear. The respondents' attorneys are reported to be
virtually bringing out the case against their clients in court. Wexler & Scoville, supra
note 10, at 53. See also, Dix, Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in the
Metropolis: An Empirical Study, 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 485 (1968).
84. In those instances in which communication with the patient is impossible, and he
expresses no opinion as to whether he wishes to fight commitment, a question arises as
to what stance counsel should take. The best method of resolving the problem is to lay
1562
Vol. 84: 1540, 1975
The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process
Though it is regrettable that relations between the professions of
law and psychiatry have been somewhat acrimonious, it is nevertheless
the attorney's proper role to challenge diligently the opinion of the
committing psychiatrist and present more than a silent defense. If hear-
ings are to be meaningful procedures designed to arrive at fair dispo-
sitions based on a full presentation of the facts, the lawyer must act
as an adversary. Otherwise, the idea that due process is being accorded
the mentally ill individual will stand as little more than pretense.s5
The procedure advocated here may reshlt in what many will deem
an unduly harsh course of conduct. The lawyer will often be forced
to argue for a disposition that might harm his client. Sometimes he
will win. And on occasion a client whose release he has precipitated
will harm himself. Many a lawyer's immediate reaction might be that
at some point he must drop his lawyerly facade and assert his humanis-
tic values and help that person get treatment. But in that instinctual
response, sight is lost of the greater harm that may be done in up-
setting a delicately balanced system. Even though it is natural for coun-
sel to think that he can tell when someone needs help, a properly func-
tioning civil commitment system dictates that he remain in his adver-
sary role and leave to others that ultimate decision.
down a rule, either that counsel should fight commitment or acquiesce in it, in all such
instances. Admittedly, either way mistakes will be made and counsel will press for an
outcome contrary to his client's unexpressed desires, but no other approach seems
practicable. As between the two possible rules, the wiser course seem to be the one in
which counsel will argue against commitment. Such situations arise relatively infrequently,
and as a practical matter if the client is totally unable to communicate counsel will
likely have little impact on the outcome. By placing him in the position of arguing
against commitment, however, greater incentive will be given counsel to seek out in-
formation about his client and the alternatives available to him. Further, as it is gen-
erally far easier to get into a hospital than to leave once committed, mistaken releases
can be more easily rectified than erroneous commitments.
85. "Procedure at once reflects and creates substantive rights, ... " In re Gault, 387
U.S. I, 70 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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